Tuesday 29 June 2010

The Four Noble "Tasks"

I. Introduction


I recently came across a striking reading of the "four noble truths" in Stephen Batchelor's new book, Confession of a Buddhist Atheist (Spiegel & Grau, 2010).


Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist

I think Batchelor's argument is worth discussing here because it succinctly frames what I take to be the fundamental issue of human existence: the nature of suffering.


Is suffering (here understood in the broadest sense of a deep, root passivity) an accidental feature of this world from which "grace" or "enlightenment" can free us?


Or is this deep, root passivity unexpungeable in a way that might lead us to associate it with the grace of life itself?


II. The Mythological Reading


Batchelor’s thesis is that the four noble truths – originally anti-mythological, pragmatic, and phenomenological – were almost immediately re-embedded by the Buddha’s followers into the more familiar and comfortable mythological framework of Hinduism in a way that conceals the straightforward but radical logic of the original formulation.


Batchelor’s argument is based in part on some textual criticism but its real strength is, I think, its pragmatic and phenomenological force.


Batchelor’s critical-textual argument boils down to this: the four noble truths as we typically receive them in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (or “Wheel Turning” discourse) have been profoundly molded by the later insertion of “explanatory” subheadings that nominalize and mythologize each of the truths while simultaneously reversing the causal direction of some key relationships.


The received, “mythological” version of the four noble truths looks like this:

The Four Noble Truths

1. There is suffering (dukkha).

2. There is a cause of suffering: craving (tanha).

3. There is a cessation of suffering (nirvana).

4. There is a path to cessation: the eightfold path.

Batchelor’s claim is that where the Buddha originally presented four noble “tasks,” this version presents four noble “truths” (i.e., claims or dogmas; hence the nominalization). Once the “tasks” have been turned into dogmas, it is only possible to make sense of them in relation to Hinduism’s mythological claims about karma and rebirth.


Wheel-of-samsara

Note how their transformation into dogmas requires that we read the four noble truths out of order. The relationship of cause and effect looks like this:

2. Cause: craving/clinging.

1. Effect: suffering.

4. Cause: eightfold path.

3. Effect: cessation of rebirth (nirvana).

Note that suffering is now understood as a contingent effect of an avoidable cause (craving).


Note that talk of cessation (nirvana) as the cessation of suffering only makes sense in light of the Hindu project to be post-mortally free from the wheel of samsara and rebirth.


On this model, suffering is a contingent effect that can be avoided and freedom from suffering is framed in relation to a post-mortal reward (nirvana as the cessation of re-birth).


II. The Phenomenological Reading


Batchelor’s argument is that this traditional reading not only does violence to the text but to the groundbreaking nature of the Buddha’s entire approach.


Let’s assume, he argues, that the subheadings that transform the list into claims or dogmas were added later. Also, let’s give full weight to the final portion of the discourse where the Buddha explicitly “operationalizes” the list into twelve actions (three actions for each of the four elements).


Then what does the list look like?


The list instead looks pragmatic and phenomenological like this:

The Four Noble Tasks

1. fully knowing suffering

2. letting go of craving

3. experiencing cessation (of craving)

4. cultivating the eightfold path

On this reading, the Buddha is not presenting a list of things to be believed, but a list of things to be done.


Note that in this light the logic of the list’s order is direct and requires no creative re-ordering.

1. The task is to fully know – on the basis of a penetrating, firsthand examination of one’s own experience of suffering – the nature of suffering as an unavoidable aspect of life’s being interdependent, co-conditioned, and impermanent.


2. To the degree that we know firsthand the truth about suffering, the natural effect of this will be our letting go of clinging and craving (i.e., a letting go of our demand for the world to permanently please us when and where we require it).


3. The natural effect of a letting go of craving will be that we will experience brief periods of time in which craving ceases altogether.


4. The natural effect of this experience will be our cultivation of a new way of life grounded in and appropriate to the truth of suffering. This new path of life is characterized by eight appropriate practices (i.e., the eightfold path).

Batchelor also argues (persuasively, I think) that the relationship between the four noble tasks and the eightfold path should be understood as cyclical.


The eightfold path is clearly described as leading to the four noble tasks and the four noble tasks explicitly lead back into the eightfold path. The clarity of this cyclical relationship, however, is apparent only when the four noble tasks are not re-ordered as in the standard, mythological version. It’s also only clear when nirvana/cessation is understood as an element along the way to the eightfold path itself rather than as a final solution to a problem specific to Hindu metaphysics (karmic re-birth).


Note that in this second version nothing is organized around a post-mortal problem or question. Note that in this second version suffering is essential rather than contingent. Note that in this second version no dogmatic beliefs are required.


Where the four noble truths lay out a path to an ultimate, cosmic redemption from suffering, the four noble tasks lay out a path to the ongoing cultivation of a human redemption of suffering.


Batchelor explicitly argues that the Buddha breaks with Hindu mythology most radically in his rejection of the idea that, at root, reality is fundamentally One. For the Buddha, the noble truths are four (and, as such, irreducible), the path to be cultivated is eight, the truth of existence is co-conditioned multiplicity, etc.


This is to say: the Buddha breaks with Hinduism in that he intentionally brackets mythological claims to a transcendent, fundamental Unity and sides wholeheartedly with the immanent and "pathetic" (in the original sense of the word pathos) givenness of phenomenological multiplicity.


Does the Buddha announce an ultimate cosmic redemption from suffering? Or does he announce a way to engage in the ongoing cultivation of a human redemption of suffering?


I think Batchelor is on the right track here.

21 comments:

  1. I really enjoyed your post. As a Buddhist Atheist, I found this article very interesting and up until now I did not know that Batchelor was in fact an atheist. Good to know haha

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  2. I am a fan of Batchelor. I admire his pragmatic and rational approach to Buddhism. And I'll hold up my hand an admit that I've not read his latest book yet.

    However, I did listen to a series of talks he did recently which covered the exact ground you're discussing here. And I have to say that I'm a little baffled.

    His reinterpretation of the Four Noble Truths seems to have to work very hard and to be almost completely lacking in actual evidence. To me it comes across as revisionism - selective reading and heavy reinterpretation in order to put the things into the Buddha's mouth that Batchelor wants to see come out of it.

    Don't get me wrong - I'm with Batchelor in many ways - I don't believe in literal rebirth, for example. But Batchelor seems to want the authority of Buddha backing his views, even when this is unwarranted.

    And when it comes to the Four Noble Truths I think Batchelor sees problems where there are none and it comes across as if his entire understanding of Buddhism is over-intellectual, rather than being well-grounded in experience. And that is baffling because Batchelor spent many years as a monk in two different traditions.

    I have come across few doctrines as straightforward, rational, and supported by experience, as the Four Noble Truths. Even, the end of suffering - Nibbana - is not a 'mythological dogma' since we can experience the ending of particular 'sufferings' here and now, through practice. Buddha talks also of a final cessation and I have not confirmed that, but I can move in that direction and remain agnostic about it.

    There is nothing odd about the structure of the truths. It starts with what is immediately observable - the phenomenon of suffering, the human condition. With some contemplation we can investigate that phenomenon and discover it's condition: craving. Buddha worked backwards like this for the whole of his account of Dependent Origination too - if you find the condition for something then you can bring it to an end or bring it to be. The 4NT is basically the simple version of DO. Just as with Dependent Origination there is a negative version describing the arising of suffering and a positive version describing the cessation of suffering. So the next step begins with the alternative outcome to suffering - the cessation of suffering and then looks at the condition for that. Also in this way it ends on the 'call to action'.

    Also I'd say that the evidence strongly points to the Buddha seeing the 'ultimate cosmic redemption from suffering' and the 'ongoing cultivation of human suffering' as the same thing.

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  3. Shonin,

    Thanks for the response.

    I don't disagree that Batchelor's reading is a kind of "creative" appropriation (though Batchelor himself seems pretty upfront about this) or that traditional readings have certainly demonstrated their own kind of powerful and transformative force.

    I think Batchelor's reading, whatever its weaknesses, is at its strongest though when it reverses the causal relationship between suffering and craving and I think he's got ahold of a real problem.

    It's true that a lot of our suffering (an avoidable kind of suffering) is the effect of craving. But it's also true I think that, as the Buddha defines "suffering" in this discourse, it makes more sense to read suffering as cause and craving as effect, (1) because it makes verifiable phenomenological or experiential sense, and (2) because it extricates us from the thorny problem of rebirth.

    In what way?

    In the wheel turning discourse the Buddha explicitly defines suffering like this:

    "Birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering, association with what is displeasing is suffering, separation from what is pleasant is suffering, not getting what is wanted is suffering. In short, the five aggregates subject to grasping are suffering."

    While it's crucial to see how craving causes the kind suffering that orbits around the frustration of our desires for pleasure and the avoidance pain, it seems to me (and Batchelor) that it doesn't make any sense to describe things like birth, death, illness, aging, etc. as being the effect of craving . . . unless one is working within a Hindu cosmology where the doctrine of rebirth is central.

    Birth, death, illness, aging - these things can't be eliminated through the cessation of craving. Rather, craving, at root, arises precisely because we are confronted with the kind of unavoidable, root passivity that such suffering thrusts upon us.

    In this sense, I'm with Batchelor: while much of our suffering is the product of craving, much of it is not. And it is essential to the path that we see and address the reality of suffering (both the avoidable and unavoidable kinds of suffering) in its full scope.

    Thoughts?

    My best,
    Adam

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  4. Thanks for the response Adam.

    First of all, let me say that I don't have a problem with there being other systems of thought which describe the relationship between suffering and craving in different ways and that these may have validity. My point is there is no need to back-edit what the Buddha taught in order to get him to conform to ideas we prefer.

    "Birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering, association with what is displeasing is suffering, separation from what is pleasant is suffering, not getting what is wanted is suffering. In short, the five aggregates subject to grasping are suffering."

    Just there at the end, the Buddha defined suffering and where it comes from, as it applies to all situations including the ones he just listed - the five aggregates subject to grasping are suffering. Birth, death, illness, aging etc are not instrinsically suffering - they are suffering because there is grasping of aggregates. Physical pain and suffering are not the same. Suffering is the dissatisfaction with or rejection of the actual condition of things in favour of some craved idea - craving and aversion in other words. Hindu cosmology is unnecessary - whatever it's origin, there is clinging to aggregates present and that is what makes painful situations or other situations that don't conform to our desires into situations of suffering.

    Birth, death, illness, aging - these things can't be eliminated through the cessation of craving.

    The suffering can. I think it's a mistake to get too caught up in a turn of phrase, especially a translated one. It does say that 'death is suffering'. But Buddha also says that suffering is clinging to the aggregates. And this message that suffering arises in this way and that it can be eliminated is repeated hundreds of times through the Canon.

    Batchelor's reading would also imply that Buddha had not eliminated his own suffering. The suffering of his death was inevitable for example. This is completely contrary to what Buddha actually taught.

    Rather, craving, at root, arises precisely because we are confronted with the kind of unavoidable, root passivity that such suffering thrusts upon us.

    Well suffering does often lead to further craving. Yet another interpretation which might help here is that suffering and craving are inextricable - are basically the same thing.

    In this sense, I'm with Batchelor: while much of our suffering is the product of craving, much of it is not. And it is essential to the path that we see and address the reality of suffering (both the avoidable and unavoidable kinds of suffering) in its full scope.

    Well there may be suffering which is unavoidable - at least for us mere mortals. However, that isn't what Buddha taught. Also, I think Batchelor is conflating suffering with pain. Suffering in the Buddhist definition is that which is caused by craving - it's the urge to escape from the present moment - wanting things to be different from how they actually are. I don't see how that can be separated from craving: desire and aversion.

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  5. Shonin,

    Thanks again for your thoughts. A few additional responses follow:

    1. Physical pain and suffering are not the same. Suffering is the dissatisfaction with or rejection of the actual condition of things in favour of some craved idea - craving and aversion in other words.

    I recognize that this distinction is one that we frequently make - but I'm not sure how canonical this distinction itself is. (Though I don't how decisive that would be either way :)

    It seems to me to be an artificial distinction that we Westerners (in particular) impose in order to deal with the fact that, outside of rebirth, it doesn't make sense to talk about the pain of birth, illness, aging, etc. as the product of craving/karma.

    The canon doesn't have to make this distinction because it straightforwardly treats every kind of pain (e.g., cancer, disability, dysentery) as being the result of trans-mortal karma.

    I may be overreaching here (which wouldn't be unusual!), but can you think of places in the canon where the distinction is made between pain and suffering? If so, I'd be genuinely interested in them.

    For my part, rather than identifying suffering with craving itself, I think it makes more phenomenological sense to identify suffering with the root passivity thrust upon us by the pervasive interdependence of all phenomena.

    Clearly, the work of waking-up brings about a radically positive shift in how we relate to and deal with our suffering such that clinging/craving no longer throw gas on the fire, but stuff is still always going to happen and we'll suffer it.

    2. Batchelor's reading would also imply that Buddha had not eliminated his own suffering. The suffering of his death was inevitable for example. This is completely contrary to what Buddha actually taught.

    I think Batchelor explicitly holds this to be the case. The canon shows that Mara never goes away, he never leaves the Buddha alone. And the canon is pretty clear that the Buddha (and other enlightened people) still experienced all kinds of physical suffering.

    And I think that physical suffering is real suffering, real dis-ease. The question is always just one of how awake we are to it, not the elimination of it.

    3. Well there may be suffering which is unavoidable - at least for us mere mortals.

    This may be our point of disagreement (and I don't mind agreeing to disagree - our differences here are, I think, probably not too substantial).

    I don't think that there is anyone other than us mere mortals.

    There's only us.

    And I agree with Batchelor that, extraordinary as the Buddha was, he was and remained a mere mortal too.

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  6. "I think it makes more phenomenological sense to identify suffering with the root passivity thrust upon us by the pervasive interdependence of all phenomena. "

    Yes, suffering arises because of the intrinsic uncontrollability and impermanence of phenomena (IOW the Three Marks) but only in the context of clinging. No clinging = no suffering.

    "And I think that physical suffering is real suffering, real dis-ease. The question is always just one of how awake we are to it, not the elimination of it."

    Surely by saying that, you (and Batchelor if you're representing him accurately) are really just making a distinction of your own between 'inevitable suffering' and 'dealing with it by being awake to it'. I don't see how this is different to the orthodox distinction between inevitable pain and avoidable suffering apart from semantics.

    The Canon does make several distinctions between kinds of Dukkha including the distinction we're discussing. Interestingly the suffering of illness etc is called 'Dukkha-Dukkha' ie. 'Suffering from pain'.

    "can you think of places in the canon where the distinction is made between pain and suffering? If so, I'd be genuinely interested in them."

    Yep OK. Here we go, for starters...

    The body is afflicted, weak, & encumbered. For who, looking after this body, would claim even a moment of true health, except through sheer foolishness? So you should train yourself: 'Even though I may be afflicted in body, my mind will be unafflicted.'...
    ...There is the case where a well-instructed disciple of the noble ones — who has regard for noble ones, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma; who has regard for men of integrity, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma — does not assume form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form. He is not seized with the idea that 'I am form' or 'Form is mine.' As he is not seized with these ideas, his form changes & alters, but he does not fall into sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, or despair over its change & alteration.

    "He does not assume feeling to be the self...

    "He does not assume perception to be the self...

    "He does not assume fabrications to be the self...

    "He does not assume consciousness to be the self...

    "This, householder, is how one is afflicted in body but unafflicted in mind."

    Nakulapita Sutta

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  7. When an untaught worldling is afflicted by painful bodily feelings, he worries and grieves, he laments, beats his breast, weeps and is distraught. He is then said to be an untaught worldling who cannot withstand the bottomless pit and cannot gain a foothold in it. But when a well-taught noble disciple[3] is afflicted by painful bodily feelings, he will not worry nor grieve and lament, he will not beat his breast and weep, nor will he be distraught. He is then said to be a noble disciple who can withstand the bottomless pit and has gained a foothold in it."
    Patala Sutta

    "An untaught worldling, O monks, experiences pleasant feelings, he experiences painful feelings and he experiences neutral feelings. A well-taught noble disciple likewise experiences pleasant, painful and neutral feelings. Now what is the distinction, the diversity, the difference that exists herein between a well-taught noble disciple and an untaught worldling?

    "When an untaught worldling is touched by a painful (bodily) feeling, he worries and grieves, he laments, beats his breast, weeps and is distraught. He thus experiences two kinds of feelings, a bodily and a mental feeling. It is as if a man were pierced by a dart and, following the first piercing, he is hit by a second dart. So that person will experience feelings caused by two darts. It is similar with an untaught worldling: when touched by a painful (bodily) feeling, he worries and grieves, he laments, beats his breast, weeps and is distraught. So he experiences two kinds of feeling: a bodily and a mental feeling.

    "Having been touched by that painful feeling, he resists (and resents) it. Then in him who so resists (and resents) that painful feeling, an underlying tendency of resistance against that painful feeling comes to underlie (his mind). Under the impact of that painful feeling he then proceeds to enjoy sensual happiness. And why does he do so? An untaught worldling, O monks, does not know of any other escape from painful feelings except the enjoyment of sensual happiness. Then in him who enjoys sensual happiness, an underlying tendency to lust for pleasant feelings comes to underlie (his mind). He does not know, according to facts, the arising and ending of these feelings, nor the gratification, the danger and the escape, connected with these feelings. In him who lacks that knowledge, an underlying tendency to ignorance as to neutral feelings comes to underlie (his mind). When he experiences a pleasant feeling, a painful feeling or a neutral feeling, he feels it as one fettered by it. Such a one, O monks, is called an untaught worldling who is fettered by birth, by old age, by death, by sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair. He is fettered by suffering, this I declare.

    "But in the case of a well-taught noble disciple, O monks, when he is touched by a painful feeling, he will not worry nor grieve and lament, he will not beat his breast and weep, nor will he be distraught. It is one kind of feeling he experiences, a bodily one, but not a mental feeling. It is as if a man were pierced by a dart, but was not hit by a second dart following the first one. So this person experiences feelings caused by a single dart only. It is similar with a well-taught noble disciple: when touched by a painful feeling, he will no worry nor grieve and lament, he will not beat his breast and weep, nor will he be distraught. He experiences one single feeling, a bodily one...

    Sallatha Sutta: The Dart

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  8. Shonin,

    Thanks for the references. They are helpful.

    Is the word for "pain" in these suttas "dukkha"?

    I really doubt, though, that we're in actual disagreement here.

    1. We agree that there is a crucial difference between "pain" (unavoidable suffering, the first dart) and "suffering" (avoidable suffering, the second dart).

    (This is, as you point out, a canonical distinction, not one that I import.)

    2. We agree that the "pain" is experienced as real suffering by buddhas and regular folk alike.

    3. We agree that "pain" or the first dart is at the root of the clinging that gives rise to "suffering" as the second dart.

    (In other words, that dukkha/pain is a cause of clinging/suffering.)

    4. We agree that "pain" can't be eliminated by insightful practice and that, instead, eliminating the second dart of suffering depends on sitting with the pain of the first dart.

    My (and, I think, Batchelor's) only objection is to the mythological notion that "pain" is caused by trans-mortal karma and/or that "pain" can be gotten rid of by anyone who is alive/awake.

    But I suspect we agree here we as well.

    My best,
    Adam

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  9. >"Is the word for "pain" in these suttas "dukkha"? "

    I'm no Pali scholar. However I do know that the word 'dukkha' is used in several distinct ways in the Nikayas. One way refers to the unsatisfactoriness of conditioned existence as found in the Four Noble Truths and the Three Characteristics. Another way is one of the three categories of the vedanā (feeling) khandha: pleasant (sukha), unpleasant/painful (dukkha) and neutral (adukkhamasukha).

    > "1. We agree that there is a crucial difference between "pain" (unavoidable suffering, the first dart) and "suffering" (avoidable suffering, the second dart).
    (This is, as you point out, a canonical distinction, not one that I import.)"

    Yes and yes.

    > "2. We agree that the "pain" is experienced as real suffering by buddhas and regular folk alike."

    Yes

    > "3. We agree that "pain" or the first dart is at the root of the clinging that gives rise to "suffering" as the second dart.

    (In other words, that dukkha/pain is a cause of clinging/suffering.)"

    No. This is a contradiction of a fundamental point in Buddhism. And I said that my personal view is that suffering CAN sometimes cause FURTHER clinging not that the origin of ALL clinging is suffering. (Or perhaps that is what you meant by 'A cause'). Also, I suggested that they may actually be one and the same - they are certainly inextricable. Or they may exist in a kind of vicious circle. However, by presenting craving as the case of suffering, Buddha offers a point at which we can stop the generation of suffering. We can't stop suffering in order to end craving. If we could stop suffering directly we would (and Buddhism would be a lot simpler).

    < "4. We agree that "pain" can't be eliminated by insightful practice and that, instead, eliminating the second dart of suffering depends on sitting with the pain of the first dart."

    Yes - sitting WITH insead of reacting AGAINST ie. bringing aversion (a form of craving) to an end and thus ending or reducing the second dart (suffering, dissatisfaction).

    >"My (and, I think, Batchelor's) only objection is to the mythological notion that "pain" is caused by trans-mortal karma and/or that "pain" can be gotten rid of by anyone who is alive/awake. "

    Agreed. However, there is no need to back-edit the Four Noble Truths in order to make them still work without 'transmortal karma' as I already explained. The principles of Buddhism work whether you believe in such things or not and this is confirmed by non-metaphysical Buddhists around the world.

    Suffering can be addressed by addressing craving. Craving can be addressed by means including 'sitting with', realising nonself etc.

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  10. Good, good.

    I don't understand this part though:

    [Me]3. We agree that "pain" or the first dart is at the root of the clinging that gives rise to "suffering" as the second dart.

    [Shonin] No. This is a contradiction of a fundamental point in Buddhism. And I said that my personal view is that suffering CAN sometimes cause FURTHER clinging not that the origin of ALL clinging is suffering.


    What causes clinging if not the fact that we unavoidably suffer impermanence (and, hence, birth, death, illness, the loss of what we want, getting what we don't want, etc.)?

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  11. >"What causes clinging if not the fact that we unavoidably suffer impermanence (and, hence, birth, death, illness, the loss of what we want, getting what we don't want, etc.)? "

    No. If that was the case, then it would be impossible to address that clinging given that all things are impermanent and out of our control (this is universal, something that cannot be changed). We'd be stuffed and Buddhism would be futile.

    What causes clinging is conditioning. And conditioning can equally be read in traditional terms as karmic conditioning from previous lives OR it can be seen as neurological, psychological and/or genetic conditioning. As long as that conditioning can be addressed then it's origin is academic.

    Conditioning conditions clinging. Our clinging is inappropriate since all phenomena are impermanent, unsatisfactory and nonself (physical pain is a manifestation of these three). This tension between how things are and how we'd like things to be is Dukkha, dissatisfaction.

    Best wishes
    Justin

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  12. Doubtless, conditioning conditions clinging and is a necessary condition for it. But it is not a sufficient condition.

    Similarly, impermanence conditions both the conditioning and the clinging and is a necessary condition for them. Though it is not alone a sufficient condition.

    It is the impermanence of stuff that conditions the conditioning that prompts us to cling. Why cling if things are not impermanent?

    In one sense, we are stuffed and Buddhism is futile: there is no where to go and no prize to win. We can't address our conditioning by conditioning it - rather, the key is to see that both the conditioning and the clinging are, like everything else, impermanent.

    They will arise and pass away of their own accord.

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  13. >"Doubtless, conditioning conditions clinging and is a necessary condition for it. But it is not a sufficient condition."

    Similarly, impermanence conditions both the conditioning and the clinging and is a necessary condition for them. Though it is not alone a sufficient condition."

    Yes OK, but as impermanence (/nonself) is the universal nature of phenomena it is a condition for everything including suffering, happiness and the end of suffering. It is a condition for our conditioned clinging, but it is also a condition for a more detached, well-adjusted attitude. Listing it as a condition is redundant and potentially misleading. The reason my tea gets hot is impermanence/nonself, and this is the reason it gets cold too.

    More accurately, it's not that impermanence/nonself is a condition for things, it's that the very conditioned nature of things is called 'impermanence/nonself'.

    >"It is the impermanence of stuff that conditions the conditioning that prompts us to cling. Why cling if things are not impermanent?"

    Given that things change endlessly, clinging is futile and is counterproductive to our lasting happiness. We cling because at some level we don't clearly see and accept the impermanent/nonself nature of reality. We want to be permanent. We want our impermenent pleasures to be permanent. This wanting doesn't change the nature of things. Why cling if things are IMpermanent?

    It sounds as if you are talking about the experience of 'loss' which is a clinging reaction to impermanence rather than impermanence itself. The feeling of loss is already conditioned by clinging.

    >"In one sense, we are stuffed and Buddhism is futile: there is no where to go and no prize to win. We can't address our conditioning by conditioning it - rather, the key is to see that both the conditioning and the clinging are, like everything else, impermanent.

    They will arise and pass away of their own accord. "

    OK. However, if such a detached attitude does not address our clinging and hence our suffering then this is just hot-air. If this was a resigned counsel of despair then at most it could discourage people from wasting their time with any attampt to address suffering. However, the radical acceptance that Buddhism helps us to cultivate helps to reduce our misapprehension of the nature of things and our associated clinging, hence reducing suffering.

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  14. I've appreciated the conversation. I don't think we disagree. One final comment below:

    >"Yes OK, but as impermanence (/nonself) is the universal nature of phenomena it is a condition for everything including suffering, happiness and the end of suffering. It is a condition for our conditioned clinging, but it is also a condition for a more detached, well-adjusted attitude. Listing it as a condition is redundant and potentially mislead."

    There is definitely a sense in which listing impermanence as a condition is redundant. But as a matter of practice, listing it is never redundant, because practice consists in nothing but the attempt to always and everywhere remain fully aware that impermanence characterizes everything.

    In terms of practice, being aware of the reaction formations that shape and condition my clinging is real progress. Being profoundly aware of the impersonal and impermanent character of these formations is liberating.

    In this sense, always being aware of impermanence (in as massively redundant a way as possible! :) is both the beginning and end of practice.

    This willingness to always be aware of it is, as you nicely put it, the sine qua non for the "radical acceptance that Buddhism helps us to cultivate."

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  15. Fair points Adam. I've enjoyed the conversation. Now I'm off to look up "sine qua non".

    Kind regards,
    Justin

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  16. I do not believe that the Four Noble Truths are dogmatic in the least. Batchelor's claim that the Four Noble Truths are dogmatic seems to hinge on a very unorthodox interpretation of nirvana as being a postmortem reward for achieving enlightenment.

    I have never interpreted nirvana that way. I follow Thich Nhat Hanh's teachings, as well as other schools of Buddhism, and I have always understood nirvana as something that one achieves in this lifetime. Nirvana to me is the cessation of suffering, which is entirely possible without dying. In fact, my own belief is that if one does not achieve the cessation of suffering before dying then there is no chance for them to escape samsara.

    Hey, even Wikipedia seems to agree with my interpretation of nirvana and not Batchelor's.

    Furthermore, Batchelor comes off as being purely anti-religious when he says that the Buddha was opposed to the Hindu concept of Oneness. If all things are interdependent and empty of intrinsic existence then it is implied that at some fundamental level everything is One. There is no contradiction.

    In our modern day we have the benefit of quantum physics telling us that all phenomena arise from a field of possibility-waves that seem to arise from some Universal Consciousness that transcends all things material. You could call this a pantheistic conception of God, you could call this the transcendent Buddha Nature (The seed of which exists in all beings), you could call this Krishna. It really makes no difference what you call it, it just is what it is.

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  17. Note: A belief in rebirth, samsara, etc. is in no way necessary to interpret the Four Noble Truths as they are written.

    It is possible that some of the Buddha's teachings were augmented with Hindu beliefs by his followers. It really does not matter... The Buddha taught to explore for oneself, not to take his word for anything. He told us the truth as he saw it and told us not to trust him. He told us that blind faith would get us nowhere.

    There are two key things:

    Everyone must arrive at an understanding that ends their suffering and...

    Everyone must arrive at an understanding that helps them end the suffering of others.

    End of story.

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  18. Rob Gee said: "Furthermore, Batchelor comes off as being purely anti-religious when he says that the Buddha was opposed to the Hindu concept of Oneness. If all things are interdependent and empty of intrinsic existence then it is implied that at some fundamental level everything is One. There is no contradiction."

    The Buddha repeatedly criticized the notion that 'all things are one,' as an 'extreme view.' The Hindu/Advaita-Vedantic view that all things are One (that is to say, "Brahman" is most accurately described as a "monist" view. All appearances of multiplicity/particularity is seen as 'maya' or illusionary; in fact, say Vedantists, all things are Brahman.

    The Buddha rejected the notion that all phenomena are one substance or arise from some transcendent sub-stratum. However, throughout history, Buddhists have fallen into this notion (one way or the other) and so we also see many formulations designed to subvert such thinking. In response to those Buddhist philosophers who talk about Oneness, others have pointed out the emptiness of emptiness: that is to say, we should not reify emptiness into some substance or thing or substratum.

    Or, as the Koan puts it: If all things return to the One, what does the One return to?

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  19. Adam,

    In response to your original post above, I'd like to say "bravo!" I've shared similar views as you seem to hold and am delighted someone of Batchelor's stature has been endeavoring to make the Buddha's teachings available for those of us unwilling or unable to swallow the party line!

    I've cut in a link to a post on my blog that relates to this discussion, as it offers yet another way of viewing the Four Noble Truths. I agree with Batchelor's phenomenological view of them as 'tasks' since it makes the Noble Truths into a 'yoga' or practice.

    I also find David Brazier's reworking of them as a progressive sequence a helpful, pragmatic, non-transcendent way of working with them. In brief:

    1. There is duhkha (as you point out, this includes all sorts of 'afflictions' that do not seem to arise through any craving of mine unless one believes in literal rebirth and thus this life ITSELF is the result of craving in my previous life!

    So, an example could be finding my car's tire is flat. This is duhkha (presented with something I would rather not have).

    2. Samudaya, which is traditionally translated as "what comes up" and thus understood as what causes duhkha to arise. And the prime cause is tanha (thirst) generally understood as craving.

    However, Brazier and I take samudaya to mean what comes up when faced with duhkha. That is, it is the natural reaction to duhkha. My aversion to the flat tire is simply the flip side of craving the situation to be other than it is!

    3. Nirodha, again traditionally translated as 'cessation' I see more accurately as 'containment' or 'restraint.' The root, 'rodha' was applied to a bank of stone and dirt placed around a fire to contain it. Thus, containment becomes the practice.

    When confronted with duhkha and a strong reaction arises, rather than repressing or expressing, which are two strategies of avoiding feeling the anger/frustration, I allow myself to feel the reaction and restrain my impulse to kick the tire!

    4. Magga becomes not a prescription of how to end suffering, but a description of someone who knows how to contain their natural reactivity in order to respond creatively, skillfully and wholesomely. Right Action and Right Speech are what I express once I've contained my conditioned reactivity.

    http://zennaturalism.blogspot.com/2009_07_12_archive.html

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